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ABSTRACT 
 
Corruption has different efficiency effects across countries. Conventional economic models of 
corruption are shown to be deficient in explaining these differences. Instead the article suggests that 
the distribution of power within the patron-client networks in which corruption is taking place is an 
important variable explaining the differences in the efficiency effects of corruption. Where patrons 
are powerful the range of rights transacted is limited and the allocation is likely to be efficiency 
maximizing. In contrast where patrons are weak the range of rights transacted is likely to be much 
wider with the rights allocated according to political calculations with large efficiency costs. 
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In late 1995 and early 1996 two parallel corruption scandals rocked India and South Korea. What 
is interesting is that although the sums of money involved in the Indian scandal were relatively small 
(some $20 million dollars spread over 30 or so politicians over two years) there was a general 
perception that poverty in India must have something to do with the corruption of its politicians. In 
contrast, in the South Korean scandal the sums of money involved were much larger. In late 1995 
ex-president Roh Tae Woo admitted that he alone had accumulated a personal fortune of around 
$650 million over a five year period in office. While Roh’s behaviour had equally serious political 
repercussions in South Korea, it was difficult to argue that economic performance had been 
seriously undermined as a result. 
 
Does corruption have any effect on economic performance? If so, why did the presence of wide-
spread corruption not have more damaging effects in countries like South Korea? These are the 
sorts of questions which the economic analysis of corruption seeks to answer. In this article we 
review the routes which contemporary economic theory has followed in providing models of the 
effects of corruption. We argue that in general these models are unsatisfactory because they ignore 
the distribution of power in the patron-client networks in which corrupt transactions are conducted. 
This distribution has an important effect on the efficiency of corruption by determining which rights 
are subject to corrupt transactions and the terms under which they are allocated. 
 
1 DEFINING CORRUPTION 
Corruption has been defined in a number of ways in the literature. The basic distinction is between 
normative and positive definitions, summarized in figure 1. Two variants of normative definitions are 
provided in definitions 1 and 2 in figure 1. The first looks at acts and is clearly normative while the 
second looks at the consequences of acts. The second remains a normative definition because the 
definition of the public interest may differ across observers. It is also problematic to define 
corruption in terms of its consequences because this defines out of existence cases of beneficial 
corruption. Economic and sociological comparisons most often use the third, positive, definition 
using the standard of legal norms to identify deviations. Thus corruption is defined as deviations from 
the formal rules governing the allocative decisions of public officials in response to offers to them of 
financial gain or political support (based on Nye 1967).       
 
 
Normative Definitions Positive Definitions
1 Deviations from Ethical Norms
2 Actions that Harm the Public Interest
3 Deviations from Legal Norms
 
Figure 1 Definitions of Corruption 
 
The stipulation that corrupt transactions should violate formal rules rather than simply ethical norms 
rules out any disagreements about the appropriate ethical standards. The additional stipulation that 
public officials are involved distinguishes corruption from theft which is illegal but which exclusively 
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involves decisions by private individuals. The definition is still open to the problem that formal rules 
can vary across countries. A strict application of the definition could lead to different sets of 
practices being identified as corrupt. Fortunately, the corrupt practices which economists have 
wished to analyse would in fact violate formal rules in most countries. 
 
The extent of corruption is difficult to objectively measure but it is widespread in many developing 
countries. Empirical evidence on corruption comes from journalistic and sociological case studies as 
well as cross-country indices of corruption such as those provided by Business International, 
Transparency International and the World Competitiveness Report. A number of empirical estimates 
of the effects of corruption have been based on such indices (Ades and Di Tella 1996). These 
provide a step forward but the subjectivity of local respondents in reporting the degree of corruption 
has to be kept in mind. It is likely that respondents in poorly performing economies will find even 
petty corruption more oppressive and therefore rank the extent of corruption higher. The case study 
based approach must therefore complement the index based one wherever possible.  
 
The recent revelations of corruption in South Korea are interesting from this perspective. A major 
case which came to the surface in the 1990s was the decision of the Chun administration to disband 
the Kukje business group (chaebol) when its chairman refused to make large transfers to President 
Chun's chosen funds. In 1993 a South Korean court found the Kukje breakup illegal opening the 
way for further cases to be brought and indicating a shift in the overwhelming power of the South 
Korean state. The Kukje case was only the tip of the iceberg. The revelations eventually led to the 
admission by ex-President Roh of his personal involvement in the $650 million scandal.  
 
The opposition leader Kim Dae Jung, one of the harshest critics of the corruption of the regime 
admitted to having received 2½ million dollars from Roh. But he pointed out that this was 
considerably less than his opponent, the conservative victor for the presidency, Kim Young Sam, 
had  received (Financial Times October 28 1995). In November 1995 twenty four of the 
country’s chaebol were implicated in the scandal including the big four: Hyundai, Samsung, Daewoo 
and Lucky Goldstar. The other chaebol named included a "roll-call of Korean industry" (Financial 
Times November 25 1995). It would be difficult to argue that corruption was either small-scale in 
South Korea or limited to a few sectors or politicians. The figures are likely to turn out to be the tip 
of a much larger set of redistributions which held the Korean industrial policy system together. 
 
This kind of evidence challenges the conclusions of those who see a uniform negative relationship 
between corruption and economic performance. The usual response to the observation of corruption 
in dynamic countries has been to argue that the extent of corruption and the presence of 
countervailing factors varied across countries. According to this line of argument, the differential 
performance is explained by saying that the practices identified as corrupt were i) not equally present 
everywhere and/or ii) that in the successful countries corruption was offset by countervailing factors. 
It is important to establish why this response is not very satisfactory.  
 
While it is virtually impossible to measure precisely the degree of corruption with any precision, 
when we compare specific cases of corruption, such as examples of collusion between government 
and business it appears that similar practices have had very different outcomes. Moreover, the 
countervailing factors often turn out to be precisely the details of the bargaining between government 
and business rather than variables elsewhere in the economy. Thus the evidence suggests that the 
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problem is not just the extent of corruption but also its type. We should therefore try and see 
whether there are differences in the types of corruption which can account for the differences in 
observed effects. 
 
2 CONVENTIONAL MODELS OF CORRUPTION 
Economic models of corruption attempt to identify the efficiency implications of changes in resource 
allocation brought about by corrupt transactions. The first step in this exercise is to identify the ex 
ante allocation with which the effects of corruption are to be compared. This is not as simple as it 
sounds and many of the controversies in the literature can be traced to ill-defined benchmarks with 
which the post-corruption allocation is being compared. Consider figure 2. Suppose we are at the 
stage shown in box 5. Do we compare the efficiency implications of this allocation with the 
allocations at stage 4, 3, 2 or 1?  
 
3.  New Allocation of Rights
2.  New Allocation of Rights
5.  New Allocation of Rights
4.  New Allocation of Rights
Intervention
Intervention
Corruption
Corruption
1.  Allocation of Rights
 
Figure 2 The Allocative Effects of Corruption: Choosing Benchmarks 
 
The problem is solved in neoclassical models by choosing the perfectly competitive allocation as the 
benchmark. Suppose this is shown in box 1. Neoclassical theory tells us that welfare is optimized at 
this allocation and any intervention takes us away from this optimal level of welfare. Consequently 
the welfare at stage 2 is lower than at 1. The subsequent corruption which takes us to 3 can increase 
the welfare loss, as in most rent-seeking models. On the other hand, it can undo some of the 
misallocation by allowing resources to be bid back to higher valued uses, though the level of welfare 
will still be lower than at stage 1. Thus even with the neoclassical benchmark, our assessment of the 
effects of corruption will depend on whether we compare the efficiency in box 3 with that in box 1 
or 2. 
 
Leff’s (1964) argument that corruption had beneficial effects in sub-Saharan Africa because it 
allowed some entrepreneurs to side-step restrictive monopolies was effectively comparing a situation 
such as 3 with the even worse allocation at 2. In contrast, Myrdal’s (1968) argument took the 
opposite position, arguing that the possibility of corruption would encourage state officials to 
deliberately introduce restrictions which maximized their take. Here the comparison (anticipating 
subsequent rent-seeking arguments) is with a benchmark such as stage 1 which involves neither the 
corruption nor the interventions which led to it.  
 
In real-world comparisons where intervention of particular types and corruption come as package 
deals, these problems are even more relevant. The perfectly competitive benchmark may not be 
useful in such comparisons. Suppose the only way to get efficiency-enhancing interventions which 
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take us from stage 3 to stage 5 is to accept some of the efficiency loss brought about by corruption 
at stage 4. We have to decide whether to choose 3 or 4 as our benchmark. If the corruption is part 
of a package deal with particular kinds of intervention, so that stage 4 is not a feasible benchmark, 
we should consider the corruption cost as a necessary cost for attaining the improvement in welfare 
between 3 and 5. Comparing 5 with 3, corruption appears as a necessary cost of increasing welfare 
in the same way as labour or input costs are necessary costs. If on the other hand it was feasible to 
attain the allocation at 4, the corruption which took us to 5 would be an avoidable cost. 
Consequently by comparing 5 with 4, we would conclude that corruption reduced welfare.  The 
need to make this type of judgement about feasible benchmarks makes the analysis of corruption 
difficult. 
 
The next step in the economic analysis is to model how corruption at different stages can explain the 
eventual allocation of rights. The aim is to explain the difference in welfare levels between the current 
level and that at some benchmark allocation. The analysis of corruption has drawn most heavily on  
rent-seeking models. These developed to answer the more general question of how the legal and 
illegal expenditures on persuading activities affected welfare.  While not all rent-seeking is illegal and 
therefore corrupt, the general models can be amended to examine the effects of corruption. We 
argue that the models are indeterminate in terms of predicting both the extent of corruption as well 
as its likely social cost. In the next section we look at some of the factors which might make the  
analysis more determinate. 
 
Rent-seeking theories have primarily looked at the determinants and effects of the magnitude of 
expenditures on rent-seeking. Rent-seeking describes the activities and expenditures of individuals 
who seek to change rights to earn the above normal profits described as rents.  The theories of rent-
seeking developed in response to the observation that measures of the deadweight losses associated 
with tariffs and other interventions were relatively small. Buchanan, Posner, Tullock, Krueger and 
others argued that the real efficiency cost of intervention was larger because the artificial rents would 
persuade other agents to spend resources trying to acquire rights to these rents till the rate of return 
had been equalized across activities (Buchanan, Tollison and Tullock 1980).  
 
The first goal of the rent-seeking literature was to identify the magnitude of the rent-seeking 
expenditure. While some of this expenditure could be legal, in the form of lobbying, queueing and so 
on, much of it is likely to take the form of corruption in developing countries. The earliest models 
such as those of Krueger (1974) and Posner (1975) argued that the rent-seeking expenditure was 
going to be equal to the value of the rent being competed for. However, it was soon established that 
the aggregate expenditure is indeterminate in terms of conventional economic variables.  
 
To some extent, the expenditure does depend on a number of conventional variables. These include 
the number of agents competing for rents and the number of state officials competing to supply the 
rights demanded. These factors can be modelled in a way familiar to economists. The structure of 
demand and supply in this "market" partially but not fully determine total expenditures. However, 
total expenditure also depends on a number of other factors including the determinants of each 
individual’s probability of getting the rent in response to expenditures on rent-seeking (Mueller 
1989: 231-5). This probability depends to some extent on the number of agents competing for the 
right but it also depends critically on other features of the political economy which determine the 
rules governing the allocation of rights in rent-seeking transactions.  
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For instance, if there are a small number of agents competing for the rents, they may end up 
spending far less than the total amount of the rent if some agents have a much higher probability of 
getting the rent. This could be the case if insiders have an advantage over outsiders (Rogerson 
1982). The outcome here depends not only on the small number of players but also critically on the 
enforceability of the rule determining the probabilities of different agents getting the rent. With the 
same number of agents the rent-seeking expenditure could be very large if there was a reasonable 
probability for outsiders to become insiders by spending large amounts of resources on rent-seeking. 
The analysis is therefore indeterminate without a description of the political economy which 
determines the distribution of probabilities of winning across groups and individuals. 
 
Similarly, attempts to relate the magnitude of rent-seeking expenditures to the number of state 
officials offering the rights also proves to be indeterminate. One of the earliest models of how the 
agency structure of the bureaucracy can affect the magnitude of corruption was provided by Rose-
Ackerman. She considered a number of alternative bureaucratic structures: fragmented, sequential 
and hierarchical. In the fragmented structure each of a number of agencies provide part of the 
approval required, the sequential is similar except that approval is provided in sequence while the 
hierarchical corresponds to the command structure usually assumed in theories of bureaucracy. 
Rose-Ackerman’s analysis established indeterminacy and showed that under particular conditions 
each of these structures may dominate in generating the greatest degree of corruption (1978: esp. 
176-88).  
 
A similar indeterminacy exists in subsequent rent-seeking models which have attempted to model 
how the  number of competing officials affects the magnitude of rent-seeking expenditures. Thus in 
Congleton’s (1980) model, the competition amongst officials in a democracy could push the total 
bribe take down if each official was prepared to accept a low bribe. But if the minimum effective 
bribe was high, democracy may end up with a higher total bribe take than a dictatorship. Once again 
the total rent-seeking expenditure depends on features of the political economy of the society, here 
on the determinants of the bargaining power of bribe-givers and state officials. 
 
While progress was made in pinning down at least some of the determinants of the magnitude of 
rent-seeking expenditures, less progress was made in identifying what part of this total expenditure 
was likely to be a true social cost. The problem here includes the one we discussed earlier of 
agreeing on a benchmark for comparing ex post outcomes. In the early rent-seeking models, the 
entire expenditure was assumed to be a waste. The justification for this was provided by Bhagwati 
(1982) who defined all expenditures on rent-seeking activities as directly unproductive. The basis 
for this definition was the assertion that the resources used up in rent-seeking activities do not 
produce an output which enters anyone’s utility function. 
 
However, in terms of neoclassical theory, this definition has the status of an assertion. It is clearly 
possible for expenditures, particularly if they are on pet political causes, to enter into the utility 
functions of the spenders as well as being rent-seeking expenditures. Moreover, as Bhagwati himself 
recognized, if the rent-seeking expenditures resulted in society moving from a less efficient to a more 
efficient position, it would be difficult to say that the expenditures were a waste from society’s point 
of view. Recall that a move from stage 2 to stage 3 in figure 2 as a result of corruption could result in 
an improvement in welfare by reallocating resources to higher valued uses.   
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Thus an important source of confusion in the literature is the assertion that the entire rent-seeking 
expenditure was a social cost. This implicitly assumes that no welfare improvement comes about as 
a result of the reallocations of rights brought about by the expenditure. To properly identify the social 
cost associated with any given magnitude of rent-seeking expenditures, we would have to know the 
particular rights which were being reallocated or changed as a result. This is once again outside the 
ambit of rational choice models. In no society is every rent-yielding right up for reallocation or 
change through rent-seeking. A description of the political economy which determines which rights 
are up for negotiation is a critical precondition for analysing the waste implications of any particular 
level of rent-seeking expenditure. If the rights being reallocated result in welfare improvements, the 
rent-seeking expenditure may be a necessary cost and therefore no more a waste for society than 
the expenditure on fuel. If the rights being created or destroyed result in welfare losses, any level of 
expenditure on rent-seeking is a social waste. 
 
A further source of confusion in the literature is a debate about whether bribes are a social cost if 
they are simply transferring resources between members of the same society rather than changing the 
level of output (Tullock 1980, Browning 1980). In theory, if bribes are pure transfers which change 
the distribution of income without affecting incentives, they have zero social cost apart from the 
transaction cost of organizing the bribes (Varian 1989). In reality, bribes inevitably change incentives 
and therefore have effects on production. Like any other expenditures on rent-seeking, the efficiency 
losses due to acts of bribing have to be compared with the outcomes to assess their social cost. 
 
The incentive effects of bribes have been modelled by Shleifer and Vishny (1993). Rose-
Ackerman’s early work had modelled the magnitude of bribes under different agency structures of 
the state. Shleifer and Vishny relate the agency structure to both the magnitude of bribes and their 
social cost in terms of lost output for society. Shleifer and Vishny’s three-fold classification is quite 
similar to Rose-Ackerman’s. Their first case is a centralized state where a single agency is the sole 
supplier of all relevant rights. The second case is a fragmented state where a number of agencies 
each provide one of a number of complementary rights. Each productive user requires a package 
of all these rights and therefore has to deal with all the agencies separately. The final case is one 
where there are a number of agencies but they can each supply all the relevant rights required by 
each productive user. 
 
The outcome in terms of the effect on incentives for the productive sector is radically different 
between the three cases. The single agency case is equivalent to that of the monopoly case in 
industrial organization. State bureaucrats maximize their income from bribes by restricting the joint 
supply of the separate rights to their profit-maximizing level. Shleifer and Vishny argue that the total 
bribe collected will be the highest in this case as in a joint monopoly in industrial organization where 
the same firm supplies a number of complementary goods. Since the rights are over complementary 
inputs, the level of bribe demanded for each type of right will not necessarily be maximized.  
 
The fragmented case is a version of the Cournot oligopoly case in industrial organization. Here a 
number of agencies each supply a right over a complementary input. One agency may supply the 
right to import raw materials, another may supply the right to set up the factory, and a third may 
supply access to credit. The different agencies face a prisoner’s dilemma. In attempting to maximize 
rents for itself, each will raise the price of the particular right it supplies so high that overall activity 
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shrinks and the total bribe collected by all agencies falls. The total bribe take falls because high 
individual bribes cause a fall in the level of activity and therefore in the demand for the rights sold by 
the state. Output and efficiency are lower than in the monopoly case. 
 
The final case is a special case of fragmentation where each agency can supply a package deal to 
purchasers with all the complementary rights necessary to set up the business. This corresponds to 
the competitive case in industrial organization where a large number of suppliers are supplying the 
product. In this case the product is the package of rights necessary for productive activity. 
Competition between agencies will in theory push the price of the package of rights to zero and 
therefore the total bribe take to zero as well. The total bribe falls to zero not because the demand for 
rights has collapsed but rather because the price of each right has become zero. The absence of the 
bribe tax means that output and efficiency are now at their highest level. 
 
The Shleifer-Vishny policy conclusion is straightforward.  Corruption is best dealt with by increasing 
the competition between bureaucrats and allowing more agencies to supply similar rights.  The aim is 
to approximate the third case: the competitive supply of rights. Total bribes are zero and output is 
highest. The worst case is that of competing agencies supplying complementary rights. Total bribes 
are not maximized but output is lowest because individual bribes are highest. The absolute monopoly 
case with the highest total bribe is in between, with a higher social output than the fragmented case. 
 
Despite its apparent ability to model the consequences of state fracturing, the model does not 
actually fit a casual assessment of the costs of corruption across countries. As Shleifer and Vishny 
admit, most successful countries do not resemble the competitive agency structure of their theory. 
Indeed countries like South Korea appear to be closer to the monopolistic supply case rather than 
the competitive supply one. Equally, the classic cases of corruption-led sclerosis do not exhibit 
unqualified state fracturing. As the authors point out, countries such as the Philippines under Marcos 
were closer to the monopolistic supply case. A characteristic feature of such dictatorships has been 
that the strongman had a finger in every pie and could in principle have ensured that the total bribe 
was maximized for important packages of rights. On the other hand, Shleifer and Vishny point out 
that India approximates the fragmented case but it would be difficult to argue that the social costs of 
corruption were greater in India than, say, in the Philippines.  
 
The model may therefore explain a part of the difference in the effects of corruption across countries 
in terms of these agency structure differences. But some of the most successful countries have 
monopolistic rather than competitive supply (South Korea, Taiwan). In this they are quite similar to 
some of the countries where the social costs of corruption were perceived to be the highest 
(Philippines under Marcos, Bangladesh under Ershad). On the other hand, some moderately 
successful countries (India) approximate the oligopoly case without collapsing in the way the model 
predicts.  
 
One obvious shortcoming of the model is that it is silent about the packages of rights which are at 
issue. There is no description of the political economy of the society which determines which rights 
are being contested and the rules governing the resolution of these contests through the mediation of 
the state. We argue in the next section that differences across societies in these respects can explain 
why the social costs of rent-seeking can differ across institutionally similar state structures. 
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In summary, conventional models have limitations in determining both the magnitude of the 
expenditure on rent-seeking activities as well as in determining the social cost of these expenditures. 
The magnitude of expenditures does depend on some of the variables identified in rent-seeking 
models such as the number of competitors for rents and the number of agencies or officials supplying 
the rights to these rents. But the magnitude of the expenditure also depends on features of the 
society which determines how the probability of each individual getting the rent varies with the 
amount of expenditure she is willing to make. In the extreme case, the probability may have nothing 
to with expenditures but may instead be determined by other political or sociological variables. The 
models determining the social cost of these expenditures are even less determinate. To determine 
whether expenditures are a social cost or not we need to know which rights are being contested 
and the rules determining success and failure for individuals or organizations in these contests. 
 
3 PATRON-CLIENT NETWORKS AND CORRUPTION 
In this section we discuss what can be said in general terms about the factors which determine which 
rights are transacted between state and society and the terms of their exchange. Many of the 
determinants of these characteristics may be quite specific to societies but some relevant differences 
between societies can be identified at a general level. One of these determinants is the distribution of 
power between the state and the organizations in society which are demanding changes in rights. 
 
Developing country states typically operate through patron-client relationships with key sections of 
society. State leaderships operate through these networks to implement their economic and political 
strategies and to negotiate changes in rights. A simple way of capturing the relevant differences in 
the balance of power across developing countries is to look at the power relationship between 
patrons and clients within such networks (Khan 1996 and forthcoming).  
 
A comparison of two ideal-typical cases will establish the importance of these differences. At one 
extreme we define the patrimonial patron-client network. The term patrimonial refers to the ability 
of the state to protect existing rights at low cost. This is actually implicit in much of economic theory 
where the state is assumed to have the power to enforce property rights at low cost. Underlying this 
is a distribution of power in society which allows the state to do this. This distribution of power 
between the state, right-holders and contestants of rights is in fact characteristic of a relatively 
narrow range of social structures in developing countries.  
 
Patrimonial patron-client networks, where the state is able to protect the existing property right 
structure at low cost, are likely to be unusual in developing countries. This is because in developing 
countries current allocations of rights typically do not have a long history and civic institutions 
supporting such allocations are typically underdeveloped. Consequently, patrimonial patron-client 
relationships are only likely to develop in a relatively narrow range of developing countries where the 
distribution of power between the state and  the coalitions contesting rights is tilted in favour of the 
state.  
 
At the other end of the spectrum we define the clientelist patron-client network. State officials as 
patrons within these networks lack the power to enforce rights. Property rights within these 
networks are weakly-defined. Variants of the social distribution of power which produces this result 
are the norm in developing countries. Property rights over valuable resources are newly emerging 
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and the groups or individuals getting access to these rights typically do not have a long history of 
possession. The degree of contestation over rights is consequently much higher.  
 
In the clientelist case, state officials as patrons within patron-client networks are unable to 
monopolize the protection of rights. Mafia-like groups are likely to emerge engaged in private 
protection activities for patrons both in the private sector and in the state. In turn these "clientelist" 
groups organize their own challenges on rights. This difference in the distribution of power within 
patron-client networks has important implications for the efficiency of corruption. On the one hand, 
the range of rights being contested varies greatly between clientelist and patrimonial networks. In 
addition, the factors determining success also differ between these networks with important 
allocative implications. 
 
 3.1 THE RANGE OF CONTESTED RIGHTS 
The standard assumption in rent-seeking models is that the rent-seeking expenditures are being 
targeted towards a limited range of rights. This is consistent with the existence of patrimonial patron-
client networks. It is assumed that rent-seeking does not affect the entire range of rights collectively. 
If all rights were being contested, the social allocation of rights would collapse without protection 
mechanisms (such as clientelist coalitions or mafias). In addition, the implicit assumption in 
conventional rent-seeking models is that while the state can limit the range of rights being negotiated, 
it only wishes to create (and trade in the creation of) socially harmful rights. It is not clear why the 
state should have such an objective function. One reason could be that only harmful rights have rents 
as in the standard neoclassical model. But most contributors to the rent-seeking literature would 
admit that in reality socially beneficial rents frequently exist (as when scarce resources or innovations 
have to be protected from free access).  
 
Indeed, in developing countries, where capital, entrepreneurial skills and technical knowledge are in 
scarce supply, we would expect positive rents pervading the modern sector. If the distribution of 
power within patron-client networks was of the patrimonial type, state officials would be secure in 
their ability to allocate or protect such rents. This ability would enable them to capitalize (by 
appropriation) a share of the streams of future rents. The net present value of their streams of future 
income are maximized if productive rights are created and protected since over time productive 
rights are likely to create larger streams of appropriable income than redistributive rights. Corruption 
in this case may not be socially harmful because state officials have an incentive to create and protect 
productive rights. 
 
The combination of economic dynamism and high levels of corruption in some East Asian countries 
can be explained in terms of the emergence of a distribution of social power which sustained 
patrimonial patron-client networks. Such a distribution of power emerged in South Korea under 
Park and under the KMT in Taiwan (Amsden 1989, Wade 1990). During their high growth period, 
states in these societies could effectively  enforce rights and could reallocate or change them at low 
cost. Long run profit maximization by state officials dictated that productive rights were protected 
and changes were in efficiency-enhancing directions. 
 
Under a clientelist political settlement, neither top state officials nor any other single group has the 
ability to define which rights will be protected and which changed. The range of rights which are 
being created or reallocated depends on the objective functions of a large number of clientelist 
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groups and on their relative power. In a situation of instability no group is likely to have a long term 
view and rights which maximize long-run profits are not likely to be created. Instead the rights which 
are likely to be created and reallocated are rights which generate rents over short time horizons. This 
does not mean that powerful individuals and groups within the state will not be getting very large 
benefits in the form of bribes. They will, but only by virtue of belonging to one or more of the 
clientelist organizations competing over rights.  
 
It has often appeared to observers that dictators such as Ershad of Bangladesh or Marcos in the 
Philippines had the power to create productive rights but chose to create short term rents instead. 
Their failure to create efficiency-enhancing rights is clear. The problem is to explain it. If we maintain 
the assumptions of the patrimonial system, we have to explain why a state which feels secure in its 
ability to selectively create rights will nevertheless choose to create and share socially damaging 
short run rents which do not maximize its profits. This can only be explained by persistent cognitive 
failure or a very short time horizon. It is interesting that new institutional economists have begun to 
stress differences in mental models and ideologies across countries (North 1995: 22-4). However, 
we would argue that it is possible to explain to a large extent the relative performance of states 
without recourse to cognitive problems by looking at differences in the distribution of power across 
countries (see also Khan 1995). 
 
The time horizon explanation is weak because these and other dictators wanted to be in power for 
very long. The cognitive failure explanation is also not satisfactory because dictators in these 
countries have occasionally tried to limit the effects of clientelist competition and failed. Marcos, for 
example, made an unsuccessful attempt in 1975 to crack down on the decentralized appropriation 
which we have described as clientelist contestation (Klitgaard 1988: 13-97). A series of 
unsuccessful attempts by successive rulers in Pakistan and Bangladesh to combat clientelism is 
described in Khan (forthcoming). The problem lay not in the cognitive models of successive state 
leaderships but the social distribution of power which prevented them from defining which rights 
were to be created and protected.  
 
Despite these occasional attempts at central control, a wide range of rights were being continuously 
contested by powerful clientelist groups with unplanned and unpredictable consequences. It was 
difficult in this context for the top state officials to create and allocate the rights which would 
maximize long-run rents. Given this  constraint, the next best strategy was the one which was 
eventually followed. This was for the state leadership to organize the largest clientelist group, 
participate in the contestation of rights and use superior organizational power to grab most of what 
was available. This was a perfectly rational response and not the product of cognitive failure. The 
social consequences of such corruption were, however, large and negative. 
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 3.2 THE ALLOCATION OF RIGHTS 
Apart from the range of rights which are contested, the basis on which rights are allocated between 
agents is also likely to be different between these networks. The assumption in conventional rent-
seeking models is that rights to rents are allocated in response to expenditures on rent-seeking. This 
assumption is more plausible in the patrimonial patron-client network. If the state officials acting as 
patrons can appropriate part of the rents, they are likely to allocate the right in response to bids 
being made by competing agents who wish to acquire the rent. This allocative procedure can be 
efficiency-enhancing because it favours the allocation of scarce resources to users who are most 
likely to maximize returns. 
 
This is not necessarily the case in the clientelist patron-client network. Here the state officials who 
are patrons in particular transactions are themselves being challenged by state officials and private 
agents in competing clientelist  coalitions. The allocative rule for patrons in this network is likely to be 
different. State officials are likely to look at a combination of economic and political rewards in 
making allocations. Rights will not be created or allocated to agents who are the highest bidders. 
Instead clients or clientelist groups with superior organizational power are likely to get payoffs for 
their support in the form of allocations of rights. This means that rights will not always (or indeed 
very rarely) go to individuals or groups who are the highest value adding users. This too contributes 
to the inefficiency generated by the clientelist system.  
 
An important manifestation of a clientelist process is that while it may be relatively easy to create 
new rights, it is very difficult to change or transfer existing rights if this hurts powerful constituencies 
who already possess them. This means that even if some agents are higher value-adding users who 
are willing to bribe to change the structure of rights, the state may be politically unwilling to consider 
reallocations of rights. In contrast, in patrimonial networks or in the models considered in 
conventional economics, allocative decisions are based on calculations of economic gain by state 
officials.  
 
If existing rights cannot be changed, competition results in the creation of new rights. One 
manifestation of this is excessive entry into new industries, excessive employment creation for 
powerful white collar workers and so on (Bhaskar and Khan 1995). The proliferation of new rights 
dissipates rents even when their preservation is socially valuable. The multiple sources of power in 
the case of clientelist competition may give the appearance of the fragmented state machinery 
discussed by Rose-Ackerman and Shleifer and Vishny. But the causes are quite different. The 
problem is not that the institutional structure of the state is fragmented, preventing potential 
coordination. In fact in many countries with corrupt leadership, the supreme leader is nominally in a 
monopolistic position. Instead the problem is due to the proliferation of competing clientelist 
organizations many of which may include as key players powerful individuals within the state. The 
apparent similarity of clientelist competition with the disarticulated supply side structure of state 
agencies is misleading. The solution here is not further competition between bureaucrats. 
Competition between clientelist organizations which include important state bureaucrats and political 
elites is already high and is the source of the problem.  
 
Let us return to our examples of the corruption scandals in India and South Korea. In both countries 
the magnitude of the transfers themselves should only be a starting point in an enquiry into the 
 12 
networks of patron-client exchanges. In South Korea our argument would be that the networks 
were patrimonial. The rights created and altered by the state were efficiency-enhancing. The profit 
maximizing strategy for state officials in patrimonial networks is usually to create the most productive 
rights and cream off as much of the rents created as possible. In the Indian case, the transfers were 
located within clientelist networks. Bribes paid by businessmen went into organizing political factions 
for their patrons who were clients of higher level patrons. What businessmen eventually get from 
their expenditures in clientelist networks depends very little on the rents they can potentially generate 
from productive enterprises created with state help. It depends rather more on the relative power 
which their chosen faction turns out to have relative to other clientelist factions. The cause of 
sclerosis is not the size of the expenditures on rent-seeking but rather the distribution of power 
between clientelist  coalitions which prevents any group in society from pursuing long run profit 
maximization. 
 
4 CONCLUSIONS 
The efficiency effects associated with corruption depend on the way in which the rights to be 
transacted are selected and the terms under which the bargaining over their allocation happens. 
Conventional models analysing the efficiency implications of corruption are deficient because they 
ignore how rights are selected and the political constraints on their allocation process. We have 
argued that one of the important factors affecting these processes is the distribution of power 
between the state and the organizations competing over the creation or reallocation of rights. A 
number of mechanisms were suggested which would explain why corruption in countries with 
patrimonial patron-client networks may not be efficiency retarding. In contrast corruption in 
countries with clientelist patron-client networks may be associated with structural sclerosis, the 
proliferation of rights and slow growth. In each case performance is related not to the extent of 
corruption but rather to the political structures which sustain different processes through which rights 
are created and reallocated.  
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